Economic entities get involved in mergers and acquisitions (M&As) because they are interested in external growth strategies which can lead to an increase in the wealth of the shareholders of the participating entities. In M&As, from an acquirer or a target's perspective, a company brings its resources, which can be material or immaterial (knowledge). In the post-M&A phase, through the integration process the shareholders expect synergy gains, or that the combined firms to report efficiency gains higher than if they would activate separately. In nowadays, in a boundaryless economy, one of the most appreciated resources is knowledge. In this respect, the intangible assets, in general, and patents, in particular, are the accounting representation of knowledge in a company. They are also considered to be predictors for the deal value paid to the target company. To those we add the size of the target company, its core activity and the value of the research and development expenses, the latter being a significant mediator variable for the proposed models.
INTRODUCTION
The history of humankind can be seen as technological progress in control over nature. As Betz (2003: 11) stated in his book, Managing technological innovation: Competitive advantage from change, the humans manipulated innovation over time, through material, biological, power and information technologies in order
The key elements in the decision of purchasing innovation are time, costs and the ease of success. According to the resource-based theory of the firm and the knowledge-based view, differences in innovative performance between firms are a result of dissimilar knowledge sources (Cloodt et al., 2006) . According to Grant (1996) and to Bromiley and Rau (2016) , the resource-based view (RBV) of the firm is a way of explaining that some companies succeed in establishing positions of sustainable competitive advantage and, in so doing, earn superior returns because they own resources that are rare, valuable, hard or impossible to imitate or duplicate, and hard to substitute. Resources can be separated into those that are tangible and property based, and those that are intangible and knowledge-based (Hörisch et al., 2014, Wiklund and Shepherd, 2003) . The emerging 'knowledgebased view' is not, as yet, a theory of the firm. There is insufficient consensus as to its precepts or purpose, let alone its analysis and predictions, for it to be recognized as a 'theory'. To the extent that it focuses upon knowledge as the most strategically important of the firm's resources, it is an outgrowth of the resource-based view.
The study attempts to show if the intangibles and the R&D expenses belonging to the target company significantly influence the deal value paid in acquisitions. To these variables, we add some characteristics of the target company (its size, using the value of total assets as indicator, and its core activity, industry or services, which will be used as control variable).
THEORY AND HYPOTHESES
Among the partnerships which can lead to knowledge sharing or transfer, full integration of innovative capabilities through mergers and acquisitions remains a very popular option. Recent contributions in the innovation literature have clearly pointed at the growing importance of mergers and acquisitions in the knowledge acquisition process (Hagerdoorn and Duysters, 2002) . Whereas strategic alliances started to emerge in the 1970s, mergers and acquisitions have a much longerstanding history, which, according to De Man and Duysters (2005) , started at the beginning of the century, evolved in waves and the wave around the year 2000 was mainly induced by technological change. Today, M&As are found to be increasingly used to absorb complementary external technological capabilities needed to compete successfully in radically changing economies.
Usually, the M&A motives that are mostly invoked for justifying the transaction include synergy success, efficiency gains, market growth or ease of access on new markets, diversification, to name a few, but there is a scarce literature regarding the effect of M&As on innovation.
M&As can stimulate, but also they can reduce or even inhibit innovation. Taking the first instance, M&As can be associated with innovative renewal (De Man and Duysters, 2005; Nonaka and Toyama, 2015) . This can be achieved through R&D and complementarity of knowledge.
Research and development expenses are representative in describing the innovative side of a company, given the fact that they usually enclose projects that are currently on deck, due to the internal needs of the company or as a result of the research the company is doing in its main field of activity. If the R&D expenses exist in the balance sheet of a company, they reflect its ongoing innovative projects. Also, in transactions like M&A, they can be a factor in choosing and purchasing another company, because they represent a motivation for the acquirer and an advantage for the target company. The M&A market encourages innovation, especially in the case of small firms (Phillips and Zhdanov, 2013) . In this situation, we can have two possibilities. One, large companies prefer to outsource the R&D function to small firms and finally to acquire the successful innovative company. Second, there are situations in which large companies acquire small ones, because the first have cash and the second own projects. This last case is known as financial synergy, more precisely cash slack (Bruner, 1988; Kang, 1993; Bettinazzi et al., 2018; Kumar and Oberoi, 2019; Duan and Jin, 2019) . Practitioners consider it a good strategy to sell a constrained firm to a cash-rich firm. According to authors Duan and Jin (2019), any positive net present value (NPV) of a project can be fulfilled if there is no financial constraint; otherwise, without the acquisition, the positive NPV project can be ceased because of the lack of capital. One example for this situation is the case of the acquisition of Atlas Energy, Inc. by Chevron, in 2010. Atlas developed new technologies that unlocked huge troves of natural gas locked in a type of dense rock known as shale, but the Chevon was the one that had cash slack, so the acquisition was finalized for 3.2 mil. dollars.
On the other hand, M&As may represent a barrier to innovation. And the most common and easy to be understood situation is the one of monopoly or of limited/insignificant competition. If a company doesn't have competition, its innovative side won't be as well developed as in the case when there is a competitor, which can represent a stimulus for innovation (e.g. Samsung and Apple, which are constantly converging and modifying, despite their different business models. Samsung has been a force on the market for a longer period of time and it has a large range of products under the brand, while Apple has a more focused and targeted market).
Another negative effect of acquisitions is related to reduced managerial commitment to innovation because of the significant amounts of executive time used in the concentrations (Hitt et al., 1991) . Even when the merger is successful in terms of the integration of R&D departments, other areas may not integrate so well, thus the M&A may not be a success, prompting a disintegration of the company (De Man and Duysters, 2005) . Positive effects on innovation will then be undone by the overall state of the M&A.
In M&A literature, the idea that the acquisition performance will be higher when the acquiring and target firm's resources are complementary is quite common (Capron and Pistre, 2002; Hitt et al., 2001; King et al. 2003; King et al., 2008) . In the opinion of some authors, the expectation is that the larger a target company's R&D resources, the greater the number of possible combinations with the resources and projects of the acquiring company (King et al., 2008) , which may increase the chances that a firm will develop technological innovation.
On the other hand, in the case of acquisitions, a resource redundancy resulted from acquirer's limited absorptive capacity is possible, which leads to redeploying target firm technology resources. Second, the likelihood of any resource redundancy in a combined firm is possible to increase with the size of a target firm's R&D investments. If R&D investments exceed the specific needs of an acquirer, a target's technology resources become less beneficial and potentially counterproductive (Uhlenbruck et al., 2006) .
Sears and Hoetcker (2013) discuss the notion of technological overlap, which means the amount of knowledge that is duplicated between the companies involved in mergers and acquisitions, but also its effect on the creation or destruction of value. Their findings underline the fact that, when target and acquirer overlaps are high, knowledge redundancy decreases the acquirer's ability to create value, while when the target overlap is low, it doesn't seem to negatively affect the value creation.
The M&A literature shows that one of the most frequently cited reason for such operations is to achieve synergy, concept that is firstly invoked in the premerger and acquisition phase and, later, remains an objective of the involved companies. Also, there are authors who consider that, in the case of M&As based on innovation, aside of the well known synergies that may appear (operational or financial) which take time to manifest, at least three years after the completion of specific operations Dholakia, 2000, Loukianova et al., 2017) , there are other types of synergies that may arise. Thus, Harrigan et al. (2017) discuss technological synergies, which may be additive synergies and multiplicative synergies. The first mentioned ones are built incrementally on existing technologies, while the latter contribute to enhancing technological skills instead of combining them. Overall, Chesbrough (2003) addresses the importance of timeliness in purchasing R&D through mergers and acquisitions, given the fact that there must be a complementarity in the research of the companies involved, so the technological synergies may appear. Moreover, the acquiring firm must have a program for integrating the purchased R&D into their own, so they create synergy.
In order for a company to achieve technological synergies, it has to own resources that lead to these types of synergies. A company addresses the innovation part of its activities, by constantly reviewing its capabilities to respond to industry change. Consequently, a company should ensure that investment in innovation matches the strategic objectives of the company/postmerger companies. Also, the entity must integrate post-concentration IT&C resources to achieve synergy (Chen, 2012) . These issues must be correlated with the resource-based approach, which argues that the competitive advantages of a company are indissolubly linked to its valuable, rare and irreplaceable resources. Patents and any assets resulting from innovations may support this theory if a company is involved in transactions such as M&As.
The need to obtain and transfer the knowledge based resources requires a high degree of post-M&A integration in order to realize the anticipated benefits (Puranam et al., 2003, Ranft and Lord, 2002) or to exploit potential synergies between the acquired and acquiring firms, related to resources one of them possesses. In the context, Gomes et al. (2012) consider that, in M&A, the resources based on knowledge are difficult to transfer from one company to another, because it may lead to loss of autonomy and employee turnover for the purchased company, and to a high level of commitment from the management of the acquiring company. Mendenhall (2005: 21) consider that there are four basic categories of synergies: cost reduction, revenue enhancements, increased market power and synergies related to intangibles. The latter are the most difficult to capture, but also are difficult to transfer across organization and geographic extentions.
The focus on technological synergies is of great importance, especially when the study involves small, technology-intensive target firms, because they allow the analysis of value creation, minimizing the impact of other types of synergies, based on different factors, such as cost synergies or market share related synergies (Sears and Hoetker, 2013; Puranam et al., 2006) .
To date, little, or only weak, empirical support exists for assessing the influence of intangibles on the price paid by an acquirer for a target company. Considering the opinion of Harvey and Lusch (1997) , there are a number of situations which necessitate the valuation of intangible assets for legal as well as accounting transactions: (1) an exchange in which intangibles are transferred between companies; (2) in an allocation of purchase price during acquisition when all the assets of a business, both tangible and intangible, are valued; (3) in support of the determination of royalty rates or license fees; (4) to estimate a loss due to abandonment or casualty; (5) in support of enterprise valuation, when the company is involved in a business concentration, like M&As; and (6) for their use as collateral in financing. Thus, they can influence, positively or negatively, the M&A and, indirectly, the deal value paid by the acquirer. Filip et al. (2018) investigate the relation between acquirers' disclosures about growth, synergies and intangible resources and the characteristics of the M&A deals, considering the use of term intangibles in pre-M&A phase in announcements and press releases and the influence on the deal value, relative to the size of the acquirer.
Taking into account the aforementioned information, we consider that the value of intangibles significantly influences the value paid in the transaction. In order to use the deal value as dependent variable, we divide it by the value of the shareholders' funds one year before the completion of the transactions. Thus, the value over 1 signifies that a premium was paid, while the value between 0 and 1 represents a value which is less than the corresponding shareholders' equity.
H1: The value of the intangible assets and the size of the target company have a positive effect on the deal value paid in M&As, reported to shareholders' funds.
The success of M&As, also the related synergy anticipation and gains, can be analized and estimated for a sample of transactions (809). In order to better explain de results there are authors that analyze the success of M&As by controlling the result for industry and services, using the statistical classification of economic activities specific to the companies in the sample (Rozen-Bakher, 2018a and 2018b). External sourcing of R&D investments can represent a powerful motive for an acquirer to participate to M&As and can be a solution to the uncertainty of positive results on innovation (Heeley et al., 2006) . Thus, uncertainty can be reduced if companies can access the needed technology resources through acquisition (King et al., 2008) . We argue that the value of R&D expenses, reported by the target companies, positively and significantly influence the deal value paid in M&As, especially in the type of M&A considered for our sample (the one that is motivated by the existance of patents). In order to improve the situation of own intangibles, the acquirers are more interested to purchase companies involved in research projects, which are to be developed in knowledge resources than to buy companies that already have intangibles which may overlap on those that already exist in the balace sheet of the acquiring companies. Thus, we argue that the value of R&D expenses is the only scale variable that significantly influences the dependent variable.
Given the importance of R&D expenses in mergers and acquisition and the fact that they can improve innovation, we want to test and validate the hypothesis that they can influence the value paid in M&As, in those transactions that are motivated by the existance of patents in the balance sheet of the target companies, according to the information found in the Zephyr database. We use the R&D expenses (reported to total assets) as a mediator for the previous model. The assumption of causality is implicit in the definition of mediation, as a mediator is defined as an explanatory mechanism through which one variable affects another (Wood et al., 2007) . This variable is considered for the year before the merger, given the fact that there are studies which validated its significance in influencing a financial dependent variable (Aevoae et al., 2019; Robu and Istrate, 2015) .
H4: The R&D expenses of the target have a positive effect on the deal value paid in
concertation, reported to the value of the shareholders' funds of the acquired company. These hypotheses will be tested and validated using the statistical software SPSS 25.0.
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY AND DESIGN
To test and to validate the first three proposed research hypotheses, the study analyses the empirical data related to 809 M&As, for the 2011 -2017 period of time, considering the target companies that are involved in M&As because they declared patents, as a motive for concentration. Also, in all the acquisitions, the purchased stake is over 50%, which means that, after the transaction, the acquirer controls the target company. The last hypothesis will be tested and validated using a sample of 150 M&As, due to the fact that only in those M&As the target companies have reported R&D expenses.
To reach the proposed research hypotheses, we use linear regression, mediation analysis and crosstabulation.
Target population and analyzed sample
To confirm the research hypotheses, the data regarding M&As were gathered from two databases, for the 2011-2017 period of time. The information regarding the deals representing M&As was collected from the Zephyr database (target name, target country, acquirer name, acquirer country, deal type, deal value, the motivepatents, primary NACE Rev.2 code for the target); financial information was collected from Orbis database (shareholders' funds, intangibles, total assets for the target company).
Models proposed for analysis and data source
This paper examines a series of factors influencing the deal value in M&As which involved target companies owning patents. The deal value was pondered with shareholders' funds. Because the target companies are the ones that own the patents, the financial information are referring to them and include data related to assets, intangibles, the size of the company and NACE main section.
The proposed variables are presented in Table 1 . The ratio of R&D expenses in the value of long-term assets; information collected from Orbis database, for the 2010-2017 period of time.
Source: Authors' own processing
Dependent variable. This variable represents the ratio between deal value paid in the M&A and the shareholders' funds, for the year before the concentration. Thus, this ratio reflects the excess amount paid over the value of the equity of the target company. If the variable is over 1, the acquirer paid more than the net worth of the target company.
Independent variables. These variables are presented in Table 1 and they are calculated for the target company, considering the financial information for the year before the M&A. According to Rozen-Backer (2018a), the data from the year before the concentration are specific to pre-M&A stage and they are collected from Orbis database.
The first three hypotheses are to be tested using the regression model presented in Eq. (1):
Mediation variable. The fourth hypothesis is examined using mediation analysis. There are multiple ways to test a mediation model (Frazier et al., 2004, Wu and Zumbo, 2008) . When paths a and b are controlled, a previously significant relation between IV and DV is no longer significant (complete mediation) or its significance is dropping (partial mediation). In our case, the paths are presented in Fig. 1 : The used method is hierarchical linear regression (HLR) because it is a way to show if variables of our interest explain a statistically significant amount of variance in our DV after accounting for all other variables. Also, our study includes variance inflation factor (VIF), to identify multicollinearity problems. The VIF and tolerance are both widely used measures of the degree of multi-collinearity of the i th independent variable with the other independent variables in a regression model (O'Brien, 2007).
RESEARCH RESULTS
The study will present a series of descriptive statistics for the analyzed variables (per total and on categories considered in the analysis), of the values of the Pearson correlation coefficients and the estimations of the parameters of the proposed regression models. Table 2 shows the descriptive of our sample of 809 acquisitions. For our sample of M&As, the target companies report patents, according to Zephyr database, and we consider only the transactions that involve one acquirer and one target company (809 acquirers and 809 targets). Out of the 809 targets, 55.87% are activating in industry and 44.13% in services, considering that sections A-G from NACE Rev. 2 are associated to industry, while sections H-U are composing the services (European Commission, 2008). Referring to the year, the large part of the transactions in our sample were completed during 2016 (26.45%). According to Table 2 , the vast proportion of the entities involved in M&As as targets are large entities (37.45%), followed by very large entities (36.09%). In the same time, we acknowledge the fact that, for medium and large entities, the acquirers paid up to 7.26 times the value of shareholders' funds purchased in M&A, in the case of small entities, which means the acquirers are willing to pay more for small companies that record patents.
Descriptive statistics
The correlations between numeric variables are presented in Table 3 . The correlations presented in Table 3 reveal expected patterns. As noticed, there is a direct and significant correlation between the deal value and the value of the R&D expenses (sig. = 0.007, r = 0.200), which means that the acquirers pay high values for companies that report this type of expenses. An opposite relation is between R&D expenses and the size of the company, which means the higher the target company, the lower these expenses (sig. = 0.000, r = -0.380). This aspect allows us to assess that, in our sample, acquirers bought small target companies that reported high values of R&D reported to total assets. Also, there is a positive and significant correlation between the size of the target company, reflected in its total assets, and the value of intangible assets (sig. = 0.000, r = 0.220), which means that the target companies that are involved in innovation-based M&As report most of their assets as intangibles (patents and other intangible assets. R&D expenses are reported separate from the intangibles in the balance sheet of the target companies).
Table-3: Pearson correlation between numeric variables

Variables Deal value
Results on the influence of determinants on the value paid for the target company
In order to test and confirm the first proposed hypothesis, we present the estimated parameters from Table 4 . Essentially, the purpose of the analysis is to estimate the parameters for a regression model in which the dependent variable is the price paid in the transaction. Given the fact that this variable has a wide range, we reported it to shareholders' equity, because it is the simpliest way to show if the acquirers paid over the net book value of equity/a premium. For the model presented Table 4 , the chosen predictors are microeconomic data, related to the target company (the ratio of intangibles in total assets, size of the company and target's core activity). The model should predict how much of the variance of the dependent variable is justified by the target country's information. The regression model is significant (F (4, 804) = 18.156; p < 0.001) but explains a small percentage of the variance in the dependent variable (R 2 = .083). The predictors account for 8,3% of the variance of the dependent variable (the ratio between deal value and shareholders' funds). Related to the significance of the variables, most of them have a significant influence on the DV, except the core activity of the target company, reflected in NACE main section. The size of the company has a significant negative influence on the deal value paid in transaction (sig. = 0.000,  = -0.472), which means that the payments are higher for the small companies, when considering total assets as an indicator in this matter (Carcello et al., 2005; Blackwell et al., 1998; Kadioglu et al., 2017) . Category of the company and the ratio of intangibles both have a positive and significant influence on the deal value paid (sig. = 0.000,  = 0.302 and sig. = 0.034,  = 0.074, respectively).
In order to test and validate the second and third hypotheses, Table 5 presents the estimated parameters considering the NACE binomial variable as a control variable. We will notice that the variables that are significant for the whole sample are similar in industry M&As, but in services M&As the intangibles aren't significant in predicting the dependent variable. Our approach is opposite to the one of Malone and Rose (2006) , who argue that the existence of intangible assets in the balance-sheet of the acquirers will determine them to expand geographically, in order to pursuit new opportunities. If these authors consider that the intangibles give the acquirers a competitive advantage, we argue that the ratio of intangibles in total assets of the target company is a significant variable in establishing the price paid in transaction. As we can notice in Table 5 , all three variables that describe the target company are significant in industry M&As, while the intangible ratio is not significant in services M&As. This means that the intangible assets are important for the management in industry (sig. = 0.021,  = 0.108), because of the specialized work and the need for patents and R&D, but are less significant in services (sig. = 0.432,  = 0.041). The intangible resources can be bought, sold, stocked and readily tradedand can be, more or less, protected. Both size of the company, reflected in total assets, and category of the company remain significant and have a positive influence on the deal value.
Next, we will present a mediation model, based on a sample of 150 M&As, out of the previous 809 transations. The selection was based on the fact that the target companies reported R&D expenses in the annual reports for the year before the M&A took place. According to the information in Table 6 , the intangibles ratio doesn't have a significant influence on the value of R&D expenses, which is expected, due to the fact that they are separate structures of the intangibles. On the other hand, the size and the category of the company have a negative significant influence on the R&D expenses, which means, in our sample, the small companies are involved in research and development and report this category of assets (sig. = 0.027,  = -0.234, respectively sig. = 0.032,  = -0.221). Although our models presented in Table 5 don't have very high values of R 2 , the last model explains better the variance of the dependent variable than the previous one in the HLR. Moreover, the difference of R 2 between our presented models is statistically significant. Thus, we can say that the added variable in the last model (mediator variable) improves the prediction of the DV. We can say that the added variable explains an additional 2% from the variance of our DV (deal value/shareholders' funds). Even though the increase has a low value, it still has a positive effect in our R 2 . Also, we can notice that the value of R&D expenses is significant in predicting the dependent variable (sig. = 0.076,  = 0.159). If we add to this the category of the company (sig. = 0.012,  = -0.278), we can affirm that the acquirers pay larger premiums for small companies with high vales of R&D ratios. If we want to ask the Why? question, one possible answer is the one related to the easiness in acquiring knowledge, instead of producing it. When two large firms are combining, usually they are doing it for market share. When a company purchases a small one, it is because the latter is involved in research, and the large one has cash slack, fact known in literature and practice as financial synergy.
CONCLUSIONS
The analysis of the determinants of the deal value paid in a M&A transaction is of a great importance, given the fact that the difference between this deal value and the net worth of the purchased company is, in Sirower (1997)'s opinion, the first manifestation of synergy. The results obtained after the data analysis at the level of the proposed samples lead to the validation of the research hypotheses.
In patents-based M&As, we considered intangibles of great importance in negotiating and establishing the deal value, and their value, reported by the target company in the financial statements, approved for year before the M&A, has a significant influence on the prive paid in transaction. The results showed that the size and the category of the target company also have a significant influence on the deal value. When controlling for the NACE main activity of the target company, in industry M&As the results are the same, while in services M&As the intangible ratio isn't significant in estimating the deal value paid in transaction. When considering only the M&As in which the target companies reported R&D expenses in their financial statements, we can draw two conclutions. First, the size and the category of the target company have a significant and negative influence on the deal value, which means that the acquirers paid higher premiums for small companies that reported research and development expenses in their balance sheet for the year prior to M&A. Second, when we consider the second sample, the 150 M&As, the intangible ratio isn't significant anymore and the category of the company has a negative significant influence on the deal value paid, which is consistent with the first sample. When adding the R&D expenses to the model, their influence is positive and significant, which means that the acquirers pay larger premiums for small companies with high values of R&D ratios.
One of the limits of the study is represented by the fact that, although the M&As were selected based on the fact they involved patents, no information was available on their number and value, so they could be considered an independent variable. Second, although the number of patent-driven M&As in Zephyr database is 809, many involved companies which don't have their information published in Orbis database. 
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